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The Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence
Sarah Bircha and David Muchlinskib
aDepartment of Political Economy, King’s College London, Strand, London, UK; bDepartment of Computer
Science and Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
ABSTRACT
Electoral violence is increasingly aﬀecting elections around the world,
yet researchers have been limited by a paucity of granular data on
this phenomenon. This paper introduces and describes a new dataset
of electoral violence—the Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral
Violence (CREV)—that provides measures of 10 diﬀerent types of
electoral violence across 642 elections held around the globe
between 1995 and 2013. The paper provides a detailed account of
how and why the dataset was constructed, together with a replica-
tion of previous research on electoral violence. We introduce this
dataset by demonstrating that the CREV, while measuring the same
underlying phenomena as other datasets on electoral violence, pro-
vides researchers with the ability to draw more nuanced conclusions
about the causes and consequences of violence that occurs in con-
nection with the electoral process. We also present and analyze
descriptive data from the CREV dataset.
KEYWORDS
Conﬂict; elections; electoral
violence; event data
While the vast majority of countries around the world currently utilize elections as a
means of transferring political power and providing legitimacy to ruling incumbents,
violence continues to occur during many electoral contests. Electoral violence can have
considerable implications for both security and democracy;1 it can even culminate in
revolutions leading to regime changes, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt from 2011–2012,
and Ukraine in 2004. Electoral violence can also make citizens less trusting of incumbents,
reducing citizen support for democracy.2 Despite the problematic nature of electoral
violence, we as of yet know relatively little about the causes of this phenomenon, or the
eﬀects this particular form of conﬂict can have on societies. Is electoral violence perpe-
trated mainly by state actors, or are nonstate groups such as opposition parties more likely
to use violence as a means of attaining their political goals? Which political actors are
most likely to undertake the most serious forms of electoral violence? Which countries are
most at risk of electoral violence? Though electoral violence routinely plagues only a small
minority of elections around the world, such violence exhibits wide variation across states
and even across elections within states. Access to a detailed dataset of electoral violence
will allow researchers to better understand this phenomenon; it will also enable practi-
tioners to devote limited resources to preventing electoral violence in nations most at risk.
CONTACT Sarah Birch Sarah.birch@kcl.ac.uk Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, Strand,
London, UK
Color versions of one or more of the ﬁgures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/FTPV.
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However, the limited data on electoral violence currently in existence has impeded the
development of knowledge about this destructive form of conﬂict.
Though electoral violence can be a broad concept,3 studies of it have usually relied on
several general measures. Electoral violence has been conceptualized as violent protests
against election results, political parties, or opposition groups,4 as well as attacks by mobs
and gangs against visible manifestations of elections, like polling places.5 Electoral violence
can occur before elections as elites strategically shift repression to pre-electoral periods in
order to dissuade voters from going to the polls,6 or it might occur after elections if elites
choose to employ violence to punish certain segments of society for voting in speciﬁc
ways.7 And while state actors can perpetrate electoral violence, nonstate groups like
opposition parties, rebels, and militants may also engage in electoral violence to advance
their own objectives.8 Unfortunately, many broad measures of electoral violence currently
in use obscure the identity of the actors involved, gloss over the tactics employed, do not
report on the nature of the violence itself, or otherwise provide indicators of electoral
violence at quite high levels of aggregation and generality. Because of this lack of detailed
data, important puzzles still remain about the perpetrators, timing, causes, consequences,
and nature of electoral violence.
We believe that electoral violence should be understood as a continuum, with a multi-
plicity of strategies employed, and that multiple diﬀerent actors can use it at diﬀerent
points in the electoral cycle. We therefore collected data on various forms of electoral
violence for 101 nations we deem to be at risk of electoral violence between 1995 and
2013. We introduce this data in the Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence (CREV). The
CREV is a new resource that aggregates data on electorally violent events and aggregates
these events monthly over a period including 6 months before each election, during the
month of the election, and 3 months after the election, for a 10-month window around
each national-level legislative or executive election conducted in each of the 101 nations.9
The CREV relies on event data aggregated by the largest automatic coder of event data yet
produced, the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System, or ICEWS.10 In the future, the data
will be regularly updated. In this article, we introduce this new dataset by describing the
data collection process, deﬁning electoral violence according to CREV, and presenting
some descriptive statistics on how our data compare against other commonly used
measures of electoral violence. We also conduct a replication of a well-known study by
Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski to demonstrate that our new dataset is measuring
underlying concepts similar to those measured by previous datasets of electoral violence,
such as NELDA.11 Our results demonstrate that the correlates of electoral violence are
sensitive to how electoral violence is coded, but that the data comprising the CREV show
very similar relationships to conceptualizations of electoral violence used in previous
studies.
Deﬁning Electoral Violence
Electoral violence (sometimes known as “electoral conﬂict”) is a sub-type of political
violence;12 it is also a subtype of electoral fraud. At the most abstract level, electoral
violence can be understood as any event in which the use of coercive force coincides with
the electoral process. A number of more contextually-speciﬁc deﬁnitions have also been
advanced. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) deﬁnes electoral conﬂict
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as: “acts or threats of coercion, or physical harm perpetrated to aﬀect an electoral process
or that arise in the context of electoral competition.”13 According to Straus and Taylor,14
electoral violence can be understood as “physical violence and coercive intimidation
directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral result.”
Fischer deﬁnes electoral violence as “any random or organized act that seeks to determine,
delay, or otherwise inﬂuence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate
speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced ‘protection,’ blackmail, destruction of
property, or assassination.”15 Sisk provides the most elaborate deﬁnition of what he
terms “electoral-related violence”: “acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical
harm perpetrated to aﬀect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral
competition. When perpetrated to aﬀect an electoral process, violence may be employed to
inﬂuence the process of elections—such as eﬀorts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll—and to
inﬂuence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political oﬃce
or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions.”16
There are two key components to all these deﬁnitions: the temporal link between
violence and elections and the causal link between the two. Electoral violence is conven-
tionally understood as violence that takes place during the electoral cycle, including the
pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral periods. The causal link, which is often more
implicit, limits electoral violence to that which is in some way connected to the electoral
process, as opposed to violence that takes place during the electoral process but has no
direct bearing on the election. However, most forms of collective violence in society are
likely to be connected in some way to the electoral process, given the important political,
social, and economic ramiﬁcations of electoral outcomes, and it has been claimed that
most collective violence that takes place during an election campaign and on election day
has political motives.17
With these considerations in mind, our deﬁnition of electoral violence is: coercive force,
directed towards electoral actors and/or objects, that occurs in the context of electoral
competition. This deﬁnition can be justiﬁed on the grounds that virtually all political
violence that occurs during the electoral period can be expected to be conditioned by the
electoral process either directly or indirectly, and conversely, the electoral process can be
expected to be conditioned by virtually all political violence that occurs during this period.
There can be a number of actors involved in perpetrating electoral violence.18 Because in
many cases elections are the shortest route to political power, strong incentives exist for
multiple actors to seize power through force.19 Opposition parties and incumbents are
perhaps the most obvious perpetrators and targets of electoral violence, and these actors
have been the objects of a great deal of study.20
Other actors may also have stakes in electoral outcomes and seek to use violence as a
tool to realize those outcomes. As noted by North, Wallis, and Weingast,21 violence is
used in many less-than-democratic states as a coercive tool to penalize outgroups and
reward clients. Though non-violent means such as patronage are generally preferred to the
use of force, leaders must be able to commit credibly to the use of force to defend informal
institutions, and their commitment means that violence does invariably play a role in the
political institutions of such countries. Ethnic groups may coalesce around certain candi-
dates, creating conditions favorable to outbreaks of inter-ethnic conﬂict during election
periods, and incumbents may attempt to instigate diversionary conﬂict targeted at various
ethnic or religious groups to shore up their base of support during elections.22 Politicians
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may also manipulate ethnic and religious cleavages during elections to mobilize bases of
support, as for instance during elections in India,23 or they may promise certain ethnic
groups favorable redistributive policies, including redistribution of pastoral land, which
can inﬂuence these actors to engage in conﬂict with other ethnic groups to gain a greater
share of resources.24 Elections, especially in newly democratizing states, have also been
found to encourage secessionist groups to engage in conﬂict, especially if such groups
perceive that they will be worse oﬀ under a new regime than the status quo,25 and new
democracies are often more prone to destabilizing protests and violence than are author-
itarian regimes.26 The clientelist linkages inherent in relations among members of many
ethnic groups facilitate violent mobilization of these sorts, and the credible threat of
violence subtends political orders built on communal segmentation.27
International organizations are regularly deployed to monitor elections in countries
around the world in an eﬀort to deter violence and other forms of electoral misconduct.
Members of these observation teams may come under attack either accidentally or
deliberately to discourage reporting of electoral abuses. Electoral monitors, by bringing
to light instances of electoral fraud, may also inadvertently encourage opposition groups
and civilians to engage in violence against incumbents, especially if levels of fraud are
perceived to be severe.28
As the discussion above shows, many actors can have incentives to engage in violence
around elections. Elections can serve as focal points for various forms of collective
action,29 inﬂuencing the cost-beneﬁt calculus of various actors who might otherwise not
engage in violence. Elections, especially in newly democratizing or post-conﬂict states, can
reignite latent social divisions, leading to a resumption of previously dormant conﬂicts.30
When the results of an election are uncertain, electoral actors may choose to engage in
violence as a complement to other, more legitimate, forms of electoral participation
including protests.31 Because a wide array of social and political actors have incentives
to make use of force during electoral contests, previous research shows the necessity of
casting a wide net when attempting to measure and catalogue the diverse typologies of
violence that aﬀect elections.
Typologies of Electoral Violence
There are many diﬀerent ways in which coercive force can intervene in the electoral
process, which suggests a need to break electoral violence down into its component parts.
The phenomenon can be categorized as to a) the point in the electoral process at which it
occurs, b) the actors involved (perpetrators and victims), and c) the forms that violence
takes. We can distinguish between violence that occurs before, during, and after the
month in which the election occurs, violence perpetrated by state, non-state, and inter-
national actors, and violence that causes actual physical harm, or is instead employed to
coerce, restrict, or otherwise inﬂuence electoral processes through methods that fall short
of physical force. For instance, incumbent politicians may hire threatening-looking mili-
tias to stand outside polling places in opposition-friendly areas in order to depress turn-
out. While this behavior is designed to intimidate voters, it is quite diﬀerent from militias
engaging in organized violence and physically assaulting voters at polling stations.
For the purposes of this study, we focus on violence and threats of violence against
people, but not property. We adopt a “who-did-what-to-whom” framework, where each
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incident of electoral violence is understood as being characterized by a) a perpetrator, b) a
victim, and c) an action that varies in intensity. On the basis of the above discussion, we
disaggregate electoral violence into two broad categories: Threats, including threats,
incitement, and coercion falling short of actual bodily harm; and Attacks, including
violence taking the form of assaults and violent physical confrontations. This distinction
is ﬁne-grained enough to capture varieties of electoral violence, but not so detailed as to
pose insuperable obstacles to operationalization. Following conventions common to the
study of political violence, we categorize actors into three types: state (including incum-
bent parties/politicians as well as formal state institutions like the police and military),
non-state (including opposition party actors, ethnic and religious groups, ordinary citi-
zens), and international (intergovernmental and transnational organizations). The result-
ing typology can be illustrated by the matrix in Table 1, which includes descriptors of each
type of violence together with hypothetical examples.
Electoral Violence Data and Coding Procedures
The Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence includes measures for each
national-level (presidential or legislative) election in each of 101 states between 1995
and 2013. We follow the NELDA scheme for the coding of elections. We code elections
as being legislative, executive, or concurrent. To avoid double-counting of violence, we
collapse each concurrent legislative and executive election into a single electoral event.
Where elections had multiple rounds, as for instance, in elections with run-oﬀs, we code
violence only for the decisive round of that election, since actors have more incentive to
initiate violence in order to inﬂuence elections in decisive rounds.
We code violence only for elections we believe to be at risk of electoral violence. We
adopt an exclusion criterion to determine the potential for which a country may be at risk
of electoral violence. All countries with a Polity IV “polity” score of 10 throughout the
entire period 1995–2013 are excluded from our data. Electoral violence is exceedingly rare
in fully established democracies, and we therefore believe that their exclusion from this
Table 1. Examples of electoral violence by type.
Threats Attacks
State-on-nonstate Government threatens to use military force
against protestors
Police beat voters at polling stations
Military surrounds polling places in opposition
neighborhoods
State security forces assault opposition
candidates
Nonstate-on-state Terrorists threaten to bomb polling stations Opposition partisans attack military and police
forces
Militias issue statement threatening to carry
out attacks on voters
Ethnic separatists attack members of the
government
Nonstate-on-
nonstate
Ethnic group X threatens to attack ethnic
group Y
Campaign rallies by activists supporting
opposing parties turn violent
Supporters of party A forcibly displace
supporters of party B
International actor on
any actor
A neighboring state increases its military
posture on the border
Foreign military exchange ﬁre with the state
military
Transnational criminal groups or insurgencies
attack election facilities.
Any actor on
international actor
The government threatens to expel
international election observers
Ethnic militias attack election observers
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dataset is justiﬁed on the grounds that such countries are not at signiﬁcant risk of electoral
violence.
We aggregate our measures of electoral violence from the Integrated Crisis Early
Warning System, or ICEWS, event data project developed by Lockheed Martin
Advanced Technology Laboratories.32 To account for the fact that the automated
ICEWS coder may simply not code violent events in countries where media coverage is
scarce (for instance in very authoritarian countries with state-controlled media), we also
exclude countries from the dataset that had an average of less than one event per day,
peaceful or conﬂictual, during the year of the observed election. We believe this exclusion
is justiﬁed on the basis that such limited sources of data for the automated coder to collect
make our ability to draw inferences regarding violent trends in these countries exceedingly
diﬃcult.
Because the automated coder used to compile the ICEWS event data codes news
reports from various countries, it is possible, and indeed substantiated, that certain
countries may be reported on more frequently in the data than others.33 In this way,
elections may appear to be more violent, when in reality, a greater number of media
sources for the coder to intake may artiﬁcially inﬂate the true number of violent events.
To account for this possible source of bias, we have included in the dataset a weight
that users can employ to weight the event data by a per capita measure of media
coverage.
To calculate this weight we recorded the total number of coded events in the ICEWS
data in which the country conducting an election was the target country of an event, then
divided this number by the population of the country in question (in millions). We invert
this variable and center the mean of this measure on 1 such that elections with less media
coverage we weighted upwards, and elections in countries with more media coverage are
weighted downwards.
The data take the format of actor-action-target triples (i.e., who-did-what-to-whom).
We aggregate the raw ICEWS event data according to the actors involved and the type of
violence instigated.34 The ICEWS dataset codes events according to the Conﬂict and
Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) ontology.35 Speciﬁcally, we utilize the following
CAMEO codes: Threaten, Exhibit Military Posture, Coerce, Assault, and Fight. We
aggregate events belonging to these codes into two mutually exclusive categories of
electoral violence: Verbal Conﬂict (includes CAMEO codes Threaten, Exhibit Military
Posture, and Coerce), and Material Conﬂict (Assault and Fight). We are thus left with two
aggregations of the original underlying event data, which are now explained in greater
detail.
Events
Events in the ICEWS data represent the action, or “did what” designation of the data.36
One example would be if supporters of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)
attacked partisans of the Party of National United (PNU) in Nairobi, Kenya in 2007.
This event would be coded as an Attack-type event. There are 20 diﬀerent event types in
the ICEWS data, though for CREV, we are interested only in the ﬁve previously listed. The
descriptions of these event types are described according to the Conﬂict and Mediation
Event Observations (CAMEO) ontology.37 Each event type in the ICEWS data has a
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numerical value ascribed to it. These numerical values range from −10 (signifying the
most conﬂictual events in the data) to +10 (signifying the most peaceful events). These
numbers are called “Goldstein values,” and they were originally developed for the World
Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) event data project.38 Since CREV records only electo-
rally violent events, we exclude all events in ICEWS with Goldstein Scores greater than −1,
since events with Goldstein Scores from 0 to +10 represent neutral to cooperative events,
and therefore are excluded from a dataset which measures only electoral violence.
We now describe in greater detail the exact nature of the events speciﬁed in the CREV
according to the CAMEO code for each event. First, we describe the Verbal Conﬂict
events falling into the ﬁrst category of electoral violence.
CAMEO code Threaten refers to events coded in ICEWS as “all threats, coercive or
forceful warnings with serious potential repercussions.” Threats are verbal acts. While
threats may incite other actors to violence, or the same actor that issues a threat may later
follow up that threat with physical violence, the threat event itself is not an event in which
physical violence is inﬂicted on a target actor. An example of this kind of electoral violence
would be if an incumbent political party threatened to ban opposition parties from
campaigning during an election.
The second category of violence in the Verbal Conﬂict category is Exhibit Military
Posture. This event is coded according to the CAMEO ontology as, “all military or police
moves that fall short of the actual use of force.” Events where military or police forces
actually use force are coded as diﬀerent events. An example of this type of event would be
if a national military imposed a curfew in opposition-friendly areas to prevent supporters
of the opposition from voting during election day.
The ﬁnal category in our Verbal Conﬂict typology is Coerce. This event is deﬁned
according to the CAMEO ontology as, “repression, violence against civilians, or their
rights or properties.” While this is the most violent type of event catalogued in our verbal
conﬂict category, not all instances of these events result in civilian injury or death, which
are coded elsewhere (as detailed in the following paragraph). An example of this event is
when political incumbents ban other political parties in advance of an election, or when a
national military destroys civilian homes in an area of the country supportive of the
opposition.
Our second typology of electoral violence codes physically violent events that result in
physical harm short of fatalities, or physical harm leading to fatalities.39 We refer to this
category of events as Attacks. The ﬁrst type of event in this category is designated by the
CAMEO code Fight. The CAMEO codebook deﬁnes this type of event as “all uses of
conventional force and acts of war typically by organized armed groups.” Killings of any
kind that occur when the type of weapons are not speciﬁed are also coded in this category,
though murders that occur in the context of everyday crime are excluded. An example of
this type of event would be if partisans of incumbent and opposition parties engaged in a
violent confrontation. These events need not involve deaths in order to be coded as ﬁghts.
The second event type we code in the Attack category is Assault. The CAMEO codebook
deﬁnes these events as “use of unconventional forms of violence which do not require high
levels of organization typical of state military establishments or conventional weaponry.” An
example of this type of event is ethnic violence around elections, such as members of an
ethnic group in Zambia who are supportive of one political party attacking a neighboring
ethnic group supportive of another party with unconventional weapons like machetes.
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Actors
Actors have speciﬁc deﬁnitions in the ICEWS data. Actors are deﬁned as the “who” and
“whom” parts of the event. In ICEWS terminology, actors are deﬁned as the source of the
event and the target of the event. Actors are always nouns and formally deﬁned in the
ICEWS Actor Dictionary. Actors are broken down into two groups: named actors and
composite actors. An actor is any person, “group, country, or location that may potentially
serve as the source or target of an event.”40 Actors have a variety of information associated
with them including their common name, patterns (text that represents various ways in
which these actors may be identiﬁed in news reports), memberships (used to associate
actors with their known aﬃliations, either in the context of a speciﬁc timeframe or in a
more general sense), and type (classiﬁed as individuals, groups, or locations).
There are a myriad of named and composite actors in the ICEWS data. A named actor
can be a politician, such as Barack Obama. It can also be a recognized political party, such
as the French Socialists, or the Orange Democratic Movement during the 2007 Kenyan
election. Essentially, named actors are recognized political entities deﬁned with a proper
noun, meaning they have internationally recognized titles and some sense of domestic
(and international) recognition. Actors are deﬁned in the ICEWS Dictionaries with seven
sources of information.41
First, actors are given an aﬃliation for which country or territory the actor is primarily
associated, but special non-country values including “International,” “Non-governmental
organization,” and “International militarized group” may also be listed. This ﬁrst row of
information is for reference purposes only. The second row in the dictionary gives the
actor’s name. This is the name of the actor as used in the ICEWS system, for instance
Barack Obama, or al-Shabaab. Third, the actor type is listed. It takes on one of two values:
“individual,” or “group,” depending on whether the actor is singular or plural. The fourth
row in the actor dictionary lists the sector or group with which the actor is aﬃliated.
Sectors are hierarchical and include, for example in descending order of rank, National
Sectors, Government, Executive, Executive Oﬃce, and Department of the Interior; sectors
are a general expressions of membership.
For example, Sally Jewell, Barack Obama’s Secretary of the Interior, would be deﬁned as
aﬃliated not only with the Department of the Interior in ICEWS, but also aﬃliated with
all ancestor nodes as well. Actors can also be aﬃliated with groups. For example, Abdul
Salam Zaeef has an aﬃliation with the group “Taliban,” while Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has
an aﬃliation with the group “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.” When an actor is
aﬃliated with a group, they inherit all sector aﬃliations of that group during the appro-
priate time periods, meaning al-Baghdadi would belong to ISIL, as well as more general
aﬃliations including “international militarized group.” The ﬁfth row in the dictionary lists
the date on which the aﬃliation began, while the sixth row lists the aﬃliation end date.
The seventh row lists all other aliases used by the actor.
Composite actors are actors that are not listed in the ICEWS actor dictionary, but are
instead formed by combining an actor with either an agent or a sector.42 An example
would be the Egyptian military. Composite actors may also be more general. For instance,
“Muslim” is an unaﬃliated ICEWS sector that does not have a designation with any
country or national sector, allowing Muslims to be an agent in any country.
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ICEWS ﬁlters the raw event data into monadic event aggregations, which form the basis
for aggregation into CREV. This is done to gather a count of events within a given country
for some interval of time. This is carried out in two steps: ﬁrst, determine a set of events to
aggregate based on the source actor, target actor, event type, and date. This is known as
ﬁltering the events. ICEWS secondly provides a numerical value of the ﬁltered data by, for
instance, counting the number of events that occurred between the target and source
actor. This is called aggregating the events. We further ﬁlter these aggregations into our
dyads such as nonstate actors and state actors. This ﬁltering is done on the basis of the
source sector aﬃliation. So, for instance, if an actor has a source aﬃliation of
“Government,” or “Party,” or “Democratic Party,” ICEWS will ﬁlter all events where
this actor is the source of the event into “Government” and record the number of events
where this actor interacted with any other actor. So, for example, if this actor fought
against a target actor with a source code like “Opposition,” “Party,” these events will be
ﬁltered and aggregated into the ICEWS dyad of “Government to Opposition.”
We ﬁlter these aggregations further on the basis of traditional distinctions made in the
literature. The ICEWS aggregations we use to form our dyads are listed in the Online
Appendix. We deﬁne as state-based actors all those actors in the ICEWS dictionary as
having aﬃliations in “Government” including “Parties” with ancestral aﬃliations belong-
ing to “Government”; this excludes opposition parties whom we aggregate elsewhere. We
aggregate into our nonstate actor category all actors with a source aﬃliation with a
religion (Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, and Muslim), an ethnic aﬃliation, actors with
aﬃliations in separatist groups, actors aﬃliated with the political “Opposition” (an oﬃcial
ICEWS sector aﬃliation), and dissident actors, an ICEWS aﬃliation in which generally
unorganized political actors who tend to engage in violence fall. Our category of interna-
tional actors includes only international organizations with the source code “International
Organization.”
Some Descriptive Data from CREV
In this section we describe some aspects of the CREV and show how the data we have
collected compare with other widely used event datasets including the Armed Conﬂict
Location and Event Data Project (ACLED),43 the Social Conﬂict in Africa Database
(SCAD),44 the National Elections across Democracies and Autocracies (NELDA) dataset,
and the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) dataset.45 Because Africa is the only region of
the world for which ACLED, SCAD, and CREV overlap and have suﬃcient temporal
coverage, we report only events for elections in Africa from 1995–2013 when comparing
these datasets.46 V-DEM and NELDA, however, overlap in their temporal coverage with
CREV, and are global in coverage, so we do not limit our analysis only to Africa with these
datasets. We show that our data record a larger number of events per election than do
ACLED or SCAD, making CREV the most comprehensive event dataset of electoral
violence currently available. We also compare these three event dataset’s ﬂuctuations of
violent events over time, and for multiple countries, demonstrating CREV captures trends
in violence between elections within various African countries and also between these
countries. CREV demonstrates that not only do diﬀerent countries in Africa experience
diﬀerent levels of electoral violence, but countries also experience diﬀerent trends in
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violence from election to election, suggesting factors unique to elections may inﬂuence
patterns of violence. We discuss the implications of this in this section, and elsewhere.
We choose these datasets because they are well known, and have been used extensively
to examine electoral violence. Daxecker uses ACLED when measuring violent events to
examine how the presence of election monitors shifts the timing of state-led violence
against civilians in Africa. Fjelde and Höglund employ SCAD to measure the relationship
between electoral institutions and electoral violence in Africa.47 Goldsmith also uses
ACLED to measure electoral violence for his study on the link between newly democratiz-
ing states and electoral violence.48 Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski employ NELDA to
examine trends in electoral violence, as do Daxecker, and Fjelde and Höglund.49
The greatest beneﬁt of utilizing CREV to measure electoral violence is its breadth and
granularity of coverage. CREV contains data on a larger number of actor dyads than any
of these other datasets, making its measurement of electoral violence more comprehensive.
Previous work has shown that a number of diﬀerent actors from ethnic groups, incumbent
governments, and even international actors can engage in, or become targets of, electoral
violence.50 CREV acknowledges the diversity of violent actors, measuring violence across
48 actor dyads.51 Because both SCAD and ACLED were created to measure diﬀerent types
of violence including violence during civil war, these datasets contain a more limited
number of actors, making data derived from these datasets less than ideal for the study of
electoral violence.
Another beneﬁt of CREV is its granularity of focus. The ICEWS data, upon which
CREV is based, uses over 300 diﬀerent news sources to code violent events.52 This allows
CREV to examine electoral violence in greater detail than other datasets which use a
relatively smaller number of sources. Both ACLED and SCAD also rely on human coders,
while CREV is based on machine-coded data. Both methods accurately measure violent
trends and capture a similar number of true positives, while avoiding false positives,
though machine coded data is slightly more accurate because it avoids issues like fatigue
and biases that inevitably inﬂuence human coders.53 Because it codes information from a
large number of international and local news sources, CREV captures a greater number of
true positives than projects that are hand coded, as many events may be exclusively
reported in local news sources that newswires might miss. CREV therefore oﬀers a
more detailed analysis of violent trends within states. CREV, due to coding local newswire
reports, also includes information on more localized and low-level violence, a type of
violence that the coders of ACLED admit is often undercounted by that dataset.54
To ensure maximum comparability between SCAD, ACLED, and CREV, we ﬁrst
eliminate nonviolent events from the former two datasets. From SCAD, we removed
event codes 1 and 2 (organized demonstration and spontaneous demonstration) as these
are peaceful events according to SCAD. We also removed event codes 3 and 4 (protests/
riots). Though these are violent events, we do not code protest activity as part of CREV,
and including such data here would produce an inaccurate comparison. Finally, we
remove event codes 6 and 7 (general strike/limited strike) as no equivalent events are
coded in CREV. We also do the same for ACLED to facilitate comparison. From ACLED
we remove event codes Headquarters or Base Established, Strategic Development, and
Nonviolent Transfer of Territory. All of these events are nonviolent.
In addition, we compare CREV against two other well-known datasets commonly used
in studies of electoral violence. The ﬁrst is the National Elections Across Democracy and
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Autocracy (NELDA) dataset. NELDA contains two variables that measure whether any
kind of violence occurred during an election, and are compatible with our coding of
electoral violence: NELDA 15, which asks if the government “harassed” the opposition,
and NELDA 33, which asks if there was any signiﬁcant violence involving civilian deaths
before, during, or after the elections.55 Because our measure of electoral violence is
continuous, and these variables dichotomous, we use a poly-serial correlation coeﬃcient
to measure the strength of association between these measures of electoral violence.
Additionally, due to the heavy tails in CREV—elections where extremely high levels of
violence occurred—we log-transform our continuous measures of violent events before
computing our correlations. This helps minimize the inﬂuence of outliers and facilitates
easier comparison between the various measures of electoral violence.
Because CREV and NELDA have the same temporal coverage, we analyze all elections
cross-nationally for this comparison. We also compare our measures of electoral violence
against the variables v2elpeace and v2elintim in the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM)
dataset. These variables record whether actors other than the state or its military engaged
in any violence during the election, or whether state-based actors threatened or intimi-
dated members of the political opposition.
Figure 1 shows the temporal trends of electoral violence among CREV, ACLED, and
SCAD. The y-axis shows the natural log of the average number of violent events per election
in each African country per year, while the x-axis measures the temporal range of our dataset.
We use the natural log of violent events in Figure 1 because there is a wide diﬀerence in the
total number of events recorded by the three datasets. Plotting the natural log of the number of
events gives a better visual display of the relationship between the three datasets.
According to Figure 1, all three datasets display similar trends in violence across Africa
from 1995–2013. For the majority of years in the data, CREV contains more data on
electoral violence than either ACLED or SCAD. While CREV consistently outpaces SCAD
in its depth of coverage, CREV tracks ACLED, a more comprehensive event-based dataset,
more closely. The correlations between CREV and the other two datasets are high. The
correlation between CREV and SCAD is 0.60, and the correlation between CREV and
ACLED is 0.46. Further, CREV not only tracks other datasets closely for all of Africa, but
also displays similar trends to SCAD and ACLED across elections in individual countries.
The correlations between SCAD and ACLED are positive, and show quite high levels of
agreement. The correlations, however, are not perfect, demonstrating that CREV provides
unique information on electoral violence not captured by these other event datasets. This
Figure 1. Comparing CREV to ACLED and SCAD.
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is to be expected given SCAD and ACLED were not developed for the exclusive purpose of
measuring electoral violence, and the data-generating process of electoral violence may
diﬀer in fundamental ways from processes that produce other forms of political violence
like insurgency, riots, and civil war. While we leave it to future research to discover the
nature of this data-generation process, we discuss some possible factors that contribute to
electoral violence in the conclusion.
Figure 2 shows temporal trends of electoral violence disaggregated among nine coun-
tries in Africa across the period covered by our data. According to Figure 2, CREV records
a larger number of violent events per election across most countries.56 The data in CREV
also closely follow the pattern of violence found in both ACLED and SCAD. However, in
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and the Congo, trends in violence are noticeably diﬀerent. One beneﬁt
of using CREV to measure electoral violence is the greater granularity of coding with
regard to violent events. ICEWS, which uses the CAMEO coding ontology, records a
wider array of violent events than either ACLED or SCAD, and while all three datasets
show similar trends in electoral violence across many cases, CREV demonstrates trends in
electoral violence that vary substantially from the other datasets in some elections. The
greater number of news sources coded by ICEWS—and thus CREV—including a greater
number of local sources, provides CREV with a superior ability to pick up trends in more
Figure 2. Electoral violence across selected African countries.
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“competitive authoritarian” states that other datasets might miss because the news sources
on which these datasets are coded do not report on such states or elections as often
whether due to restrictions on media freedoms, or lack of organizational capacity, like
foreign bureaus.
CREV, we believe, is a superior dataset for examining electoral violence. While CREV
was created for the explicit purpose of measuring electoral violence, the other datasets
compared in this section have been developed for diﬀerent purposes. This can create
problems when using these event datasets to measure a speciﬁc form of violence—like
electoral violence—which the dataset was not created to explicitly measure. For example,
one of the most violent elections in our data was the 2007 election in Kenya. During this
election, over 1000 people were killed and over half a million were forcibly displaced.57
Comparing SCAD directly to CREV, we ﬁnd that SCAD recorded only eleven events
corresponding to 163 deaths during the 10-month window around the 2007 election.
SCAD did code a single event—tribal groups attacking other tribal groups—as lasting for
the whole year, and codes the number of deaths related to that event at 300, so it still
captures an important instance of electoral violence, but the data in SCAD severely
understate the level of violence during that election. ACLED fares better, however.
ACLED records one 144 violent events during the 10-month window around the election.
ACLED also records 714 deaths during this period.
We know from other sources, that SCAD and ACLED most likely undercount the
actual number of events and deaths that occurred during this election. CREV provides a
larger number of total violent events for this as well as other elections suggesting that our
data are picking up a stronger empirical signal related to electoral violence, especially in
Africa. Compare the number of violent events during the Kenyan 2007 election found in
ACLED and SCAD to CREV. CREV records a total of 748 events of material conﬂict.
There were 293 events of nonstate to nonstate conﬂict, 134 events of conﬂict from
nonstate groups towards state forces, and 321 events of conﬂict by state forces to nonstate
forces. While we do not claim that the results of the CREV are the deﬁnitive account of
every single violent event that took place in Kenya during this electoral cycle, we believe
that our data better represent the extremely high levels of violence that wracked this
election when compared with other datasets commonly used to study electoral violence.
We believe CREV will be an extremely useful resource for scholars and practitioners
interested in electoral violence. Because of the underlying ICEWS data upon which CREV
is based, it is able to capture more ﬁne-grained data on electoral violence. As we have
shown in regard to Africa, a region where elections are often prone to violence, CREV
captures similar trends in electoral violence both across time and across diﬀerent countries
when compared to two other important event datasets currently in use by scholars. We
now show that CREV captures similar global dynamics of electoral violence as other cross-
national datasets of electoral violence currently in use, NELDA and V-DEM.
In addition to correlating strongly with existing event datasets commonly used to
measure political violence, CREV also correlates positively with existing measures of
electoral violence in NELDA and V-DEM. We again use poly-serial correlations. The
variables we compare to our measures of electoral violence in CREV are NELDA 33, which
is a dichotomous variable indicating whether there were any civilian deaths due to
electoral violence, NELDA 15, a dichotomous variable indicating whether the government
threatened the opposition, v2elpeace from V-DEM, and v2elintim from V-DEM. The ﬁnal
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two variables are ordinal measures of whether nonstate actors engaged in violence, and
whether the government threatened the opposition, respectively. Because of the heavy tails
in our distributions of violence, we ﬁrst take the natural logarithm of our measures before
dichotomizing our measures of electoral violence and computing the correlation.
Our measures of material electoral conﬂict—our measures of physical violence
created by aggregating CAMEO codes Fight and Assault—correlate well with standard
measures of electoral violence. Correlations with NELDA 33—one of the most com-
monly used measures of electoral violence—are especially robust. We create a measure
of physical violence across all nonstate and state dyads by summing the relevant counts
of violent events. This summed measure correlates highly with NELDA 33 and is
statistically signiﬁcant at 0.53 (0.04). NELDA 33 also correlates well with each indivi-
dual measure of electoral violence. The correlation between NELDA 33 and our
measure of state to nonstate attacks is 0.49 (0.04); the correlation is the same between
NELDA 33 and attacks from nonstate actors towards other nonstate actors. The
correlation between NELDA 33 and our measure of nonstate to state violent attacks
is 0.48 (0.04). Our measures also correlate well with v2elpeace, the variable measuring
electoral conﬂict in V-DEM. The correlation between all attacks and v2elpeace is 0.35
(0.04). Correlations between this variable and nonstate to nonstate and nonstate to
state attacks are 0.33 and 0.32 respectively, and also signiﬁcant.
The correlations between the measures of physical violence and threats in CREV and
other measures of threats are lower. The correlation between v2elintim and our measure of
state to nonstate threats is 0.20 (0.05), and the correlation between NELDA 15 and the
same variable is 0.23 (0.05). These correlations are positive, indicating that our variables
are measuring some similar underlying trends. However, our measures of electoral threats
are measuring diﬀerent concepts from either NELDA 33 or v2elintim. These variables are
generally measuring whether the government attempted to repress opposition parties,
while our variables measure more general threatening behavior directed at a greater
number of nonstate actors. Rather than measuring repression inherent in the electoral
process, our variables measure more distinct verbal threats. NELDA and V-DEM con-
ceptualize threatening behavior as repression, while ours measure a diﬀerent concept.
Taken together, however, these positive correlations, especially with NELDA 33, a widely
used measure of electoral violence, indicate that the data in CREV are measuring broadly
similar concepts.
Replication Study with CREV
To demonstrate the theoretical and empirical validity of the underlying measures of electoral
violence comprising CREV, in this section we replicate an existing cross-national study of
electoral violence, Emilie Hafner-Burton, Susan Hyde, and Ryan Jablonski’s analysis entitled
“When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?”58 We ﬁnd that the authors’ main
ﬁnding—governments resort to pre-election violence when polling indicates an electoral loss
and when institutional constraints on executive power are low—is reversed. Unfavorable
polling suggests that governments are less likely to resort to electoral violence. However,
other results reported by the authors continue to hold.
Because our variable measuring electoral violence is a count variable, and shows
signiﬁcant over-dispersion, we utilize a negative binomial model for our analysis. To
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directly compare our measure of state-led electoral violence to the original model, we also
dichotomize our measure. All elections with less than the mean number of violent events
(45 events) are recoded as zero, while all elections with 45 or more events are recoded as
one. We utilize a logistic regression, as per the original model of Hafner-Burton and
colleagues, to directly compare the results of our new measure of electoral violence with
their original analysis. The results of these regressions are shown in Table 2.
Our analysis of these statistical models shows that the results obtained in the original
study are subject to the coding of the dependent variable. When the dependent variable is
coded as a continuous count of electorally violent events, the main ﬁnding of the original
study—unfavorable polling is correlated with more electoral violence—is reversed. We
ﬁnd that unfavorable polls for incumbents are correlated with less electoral violence. On
the other hand, when we recode our continuous measure of state-led electoral violence for
the logistic regression model, the results obtained in the original study continue to hold.
When the dependent variable is dichotomous, polling that indicates an incumbent will
lose an election is associated with more electoral violence.
On the one hand, this analysis demonstrates that CREV is picking up on the same
underlying data-generating process found in datasets previously used to study electoral
violence. This gives us conﬁdence in the validity of our measures. On the other hand,
CREV demonstrates something new. Our continuous measure of electoral violence shows
incumbents are less willing to resort to electoral violence given unfavorable polling, but at
the same time, a dichotomous version of this same variable produces results indicating the
Table 2. Replication results.
Variable
Hafner-Burton, Hyde,
and Jablonski (2014)
Replication—Negative
Binomial Replication—Logit
Polling Unfavorable 2.37* −5.04* 14.37*
(1.07) (1.88) (5.45)
Executive Constraints 0.20 −1.06* −0.46
(0.21) (0.21) (0.51)
Polling Unfavorable X
Executive Constraints
−0.49* 0.60* −2.94*
(0.20) (0.30) (1.07)
Physical Integrity −0.44* −0.52* −3.21*
(0.12) (0.12) (1.26)
Political Competition −0.18 −0.52* −0.75
(0.10) (0.17) (0.43)
Executive Recruitment 0.31 −0.55* 1.85*
(0.16) (0.22) (0.82)
Population 0.36 0.30 1.04
(0.27) (0.19) (0.75)
GDP −0.28 0.45* 0.38
(0.19) (0.18) (0.66)
Leader Tenure 0.00 0.003 0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.51)
Leader Age 0.12 −0.09 −0.48
(0.17) (0.19) (0.51)
Civil War 0.54* 0.00 −0.71
(0.28) (0.41) (1.18)
Electoral Fraud 1.60* 0.02 2.45*
(0.42) (0.30) (1.49)
Demonstrations 0.12* 0.02 0.60*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.21)
Log-Likelihood −227.1 −253.72 −257.74
N 602 602 602
* p < 0.05
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opposite. This suggests that there may be a threshold eﬀect for polling. If polls are very
unfavorable, incumbents are loath to engage in violence since it incurs costs that are
unlikely to lead to a higher chance of winning the election. If polls are only slightly
unfavorable, however, the strategic use of violence may make more sense, because only a
small amount may suﬃce to alter the outcome of the election in a way favorable to the
incumbent.
A full exploration of this result is beyond the scope of this article, which aims to
introduce CREV and show some descriptive statistics. We leave it to future research to
more completely determine the eﬀects of electoral competition on electoral violence.
We do note in the conclusion that CREV shows a high level of variation in electoral
violence within countries from election to election, suggesting that eﬀects endogenous
to the electoral process itself may explain a great deal of variation in electoral
violence. This is in line with the result shown above in the replication study. Very
unfavorable polling might cause incumbents to be less willing to engage in electoral
violence, but this polling can change from election to election given the nature of the
candidates in the race, prevailing sentiments expressed by public opinion, and other
factors.
Conclusion
The study of electoral violence has grown substantially in recent years. Thanks to this
burgeoning literature, scholars have been able to investigate many aspects of this unique
category of political violence. Unfortunately, many of the datasets used to measure
electoral violence have suﬀered from conceptual problems, making the data used to
study this subject opaque. The dataset on Countries at Risk for Electoral Violence allows
scholars access to more detailed data on electoral violence than any other dataset available.
The nature of CREV as an event dataset means that research can now be carried out at a
more detailed level of analysis than has previously been possible. CREV, in addition to a
greater depth of analysis into electoral violence, also codes violent activity among a greater
number of electoral actors, making it the most comprehensive dataset of electoral violence
currently available.
We have demonstrated that our dataset correlates positively and closely with other
datasets previously used to study electoral violence, and that results carried out on the
basis of this dataset comport with previous studies, but also show novel results that can
drive the ﬁeld of electoral violence forward in new directions.
Our descriptive analyses of the CREV data yield some interesting ﬁndings that are
worth exploring in greater detail in future research. One of the most intriguing results to
emerge from the granular CREV data is the high degree of variability in levels of violence
within countries from one election to the next; on virtually all of the CREV indicators,
within-country variance is not much smaller than between-country variance. An aggregate
measure of all types of state violence in the CREV dataset has a mean of 85.97 events,
within-country variance of 131.88, and between-country variance of 149.59. The corre-
sponding ﬁgures for an aggregate measure of all forms of nonstate violence are a mean of
156.72, within-country variance of 250.59, and between-country variance of 364.70. These
data suggest that there is a large degree of variability in levels of violence across the globe
—as one would expect—but that in given countries at risk of violence the number of
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actual violence events that occur over any given electoral cycle is not easily predicted on
the basis of that country’s electoral history. This fact has implications for the way in which
state and nonstate actors alike perceive the risk of violence being perpetrated against them;
they may well in many cases not know how likely it is that the other side will opt to use
violence as an electoral tool, and this uncertainty has strategic implications that could be
usefully explored in future research.
A related ﬁnding is the high degree of variation in levels of violence across countries
that are in many respects relatively similar, such as those on the African continent. This
comes out quite clearly in the pan-African data set out in Figure 2, where there is little
evidence of any kind of common trend. This, together with the variability of violence
within countries, strongly suggests that violence is conditioned by factors speciﬁc to the
electoral event in question. Violence appears to track electoral competitiveness in Nigeria
and Zimbabwe, but there is less clear-cut evidence of a relationship of this sort in the other
states displayed here. This is another topic that could be usefully probed using the CREV
data.
Another question on which the CREV data would undoubtedly yield interesting
insights is the way in which electoral actors mobilize others to engage in violent acts,
against both cultural outgroups and political rivals. The “production” of violence has been
explored extensively in case studies, but there have heretofore been few datasets with
suﬃciently detailed data to enable researchers to explore patterns of interactions between
actors over time within and across elections.
The study of violence has for years presented challenges to researchers, as the illicit use
of force is typically not widely advertised by it perpetrators, and the parties involved have
strong incentives to disseminate narratives of violent events that suit their ends. Electoral
violence is no exception to this general rule. In compiling the Countries at Risk of
Electoral Violence dataset, we hope to have produced a resource that will be of great
use to both scholars and practitioners in their quests to understand elections that are
aﬀected by conﬂict.
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